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In 2000-2005 four post-Soviet leaders-Milosevic (Serbia 2000); Shevardnadze (Georgia 2003); 
Kuchma (Ukraine 2004); and Akaev (Kyrgyzstan 2005) - found themselves stripped of power 
as a result of a new political phenomenon- electoral revolution. Surprisingly, in the mostly 
anarchical political world based on sheer power and force, non-violent protests successfully
overpowered the formidable tools available at the (semi)-authoritarian regimes’ disposal. In the 
enigma of the modern world, the roses have replaced guns and street demonstrations have 
replaced street fighting. In all these cases, non-violent means succeeded in achieving the 
oppositions’ goal-bringing down the ruling regimes- and inspired the opposition forces in other 
post-Soviet countries to attempt to repeat this success. On the other hand, in order to 
challenge the spread of electoral revolutions, the post-Soviet regimes were compelled to 
undertake dramatic steps in terms of developing anti-revolutionary measures. The wave of 
peaceful revolutions dubbed as a “the fourth wave of democratization” 1 and the regimes’ 
response to them have unleashed dramatic processes which are going to shape the political 
processes in the region for years to come. 
Hardly any other political development in the region has had such a tremendous impact on the 
post-Soviet regimes as an electoral revolution. These regimes perceived electoral revolutions as 
a mortal threat to their authority, the most ferocious enemy, which should be combated and 
defeated at any means. The question “who is next?” was menacingly echoing in the presidential 
palaces in the Moscow, Baku, Astana, Minks, etc. The regimes had every reason to be worried 
about their survival. With upcoming elections in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, a 
probability of next ‘color revolution’ looked realistic. There seemed to be all preconditions for 
this-enthusiastic and determined opposition, groups of population discontented with the 
regimes’ performance, international backing for change. Markov, a leading Russian political 
technologist even calculated which post-Soviet county had a higher chance of ‘hosting’ 
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electoral revolution “I think the ‘Orange Revolution’ in Moldova is about 80 percent ready; in 
Kyrgyzstan it is 40 percent ready, and in Kazakhstan it is 30 percent ready”.2
Even immunity of the most powerful post-Soviet country- Russia- against ‘orange virus’ 3
seemed deficient and provoked the Member of Russia’s Parliament Mikhail Delyagin                        
( Motherland Party) to state that “ there are many signs suggesting that revolution in Russia is 
inevitable, and nearly everyone already understands that”4. Yet, despite all these calculations 
and expectations and oppositions’ efforts to stage revolutions, in the period of three years since 
last post-Soviet electoral revolution- Kyrgyzstan March 2005- no electoral revolution has taken 
place. With this regard, the most evident question, which can be posed is “have the post-
Soviet regimes succeeded in defeating a threat of electoral revolutions?”
Research on this question reveals a very interesting and complex picture. The major part in the 
post-Soviet regimes’ success in defeating electoral revolutions can be attributed to specific anti-
revolutionary strategy and measures developed and carried out by these regimes. Since these 
revolutions, the idea that these regimes constantly kept in mind has been” in tightening screws, 
you can break the thread. And therefore the elites need to learn more complicated games of 
patience. Forewarned means armed. The experience of Georgia and Ukraine is invaluable for 
those who wish to retain their power or to hand it over to their successors”5. The leaders of 
post-Soviet regimes studied and analyzed the experience of their ‘unfortunate’ Serbian, 
Georgian, Ukrainian and Kyrgyz colleagues. They employed the ‘brightest minds’ they had at 
their disposal, used the resources of think tanks and the intelligence services to study the causes 
and mechanisms of electoral revolutions and finally came up with the product of their labor-
antirevolutionary ‘antidote’- a combination of anti-revolutionary measures. The use of these 
methods can be observed during the presidential elections in Belarus 2006 and parliamentary 
elections in Azerbaijan 2005. In these countries these measures proved effective in sealing the 
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regimes’ electoral ‘victory’ and suppressing the opposition’s attempts of protesting against the 
fraudulent elections. Anti-revolutionary measures are actively being used for “tightening 
screws” for upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections in Russia 2007-2008 in which 
the Russian regime hopes to insure smooth transition of power to the ‘hand-picked’ successor. 
By now it seems these anti-revolutionary measures are indeed effective tools against electoral 
revolutions. Deeper analyzes into each above-mentioned elections unfolds a detailed picture on 
the true nature and forms of anti-revolutionary measures.  
The Presidential Elections in Belarus on March 19, 2006, particularly represent a case-book 
scenario of use of anti-revolutionary measures. At these elections the incumbent Aleksander
Lukashenko was confronted three candidates- Alexander Milinkievic (United Democratic
Forces of Belarus), Sergei Gaidukevich (Liberal Democratic Party of Belarus), and Alaksandar 
Kazulin (Belarusian Social Democratic Party). Among the opposition candidates, Milinkievic 
was considered to be the major contender against the incumbent Lukashenko. His style of 
campaigning resembled the experience of the leaders of the previous electoral revolutions in 
Georgia and Ukraine. He was traveling extensively in the regions of the country and exposing 
the negative sides of the regime. He also visited several European countries and met with 
national leaders as well as EU officials. His active campaigning coupled with that of Kazulin, 
also a vocal critic of the regime, was a considerable irritating factor for the regime, especially 
taking into account that the opposition never concealed their desire to see a repetition of the 
electoral revolution in Belarus. 
Belarusian regime’s measures aiming at preventing the electoral revolution as a response to the 
elections manipulations during the presidential elections were carried at the wide front. They 
were aimed against the political opposition and civil society. Hundreds of opposition’s activists 
were arrested and the demonstrations were dispelled. The police’s ‘flexibility’ to suppress the 
demonstration was enhanced with the amendments to the Police Law, which granted the 
president a right to make decisions on the use of firearms by police in peacetime. Belarusian 
President Lukashenko threatened that “any attempt to destabilize the situation will be met with 
drastic action. We will wring the necks of those who are actually doing it and those who are 
instigating these acts”6. The loyalty of the law-enforcement bodies was achieved by conducting 
purges among the high ranking officials; for example, KGB chief Leanid Eryn was fired for 
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meeting with the opposition demonstrations. The Prosecutor-General Viktar Sheiman was 
appointed as the Head of the Presidential Administration with a clear mandate “to consolidate 
the power systems, unity the command structure, and avoid situations such as those that had 
occurred south of the border”.7 The opposition was attacked from another front as well- in 
early 2005 the new Housing Code which required that the party offices to be located only in 
the office buildings resulted in the closure of three hundred party offices,  considerably 
impeding the opposition’s organizational capacity.
The regime undertook harsh measures against non-governmental organizations- in November 
2005, the government adopted amendments to the Criminal Code according to which 
participation in activities of de-registered NGOs by up to three years in prison.Four key leaders 
of the largest election monitoring ‘Partnership’ were arrested in February 2006 on charges of 
“organizing fraudulent exit polls and planning a violent uprising after the election”8. 
Independent Institute for Socio-Economic and Political Studies, the independent polling 
agency in the past critical against the official election and referenda result, was banned by the 
court in April 2005; conducting of public opinion surveys without a license were considered to 
be a crime.  A regular pattern was to portray these NGOs as closely linked with foreign security 
services. Viktor Veger, deputy chief of Belarus' security service, argued that “certain forces 
want to implement a so called velvet revolution through NGOs for 50 million dollars”9 .The 
usual reference was made to ‘meddling in internal affairs” of Belarus by the international 
community in order to conduct“ acts of banditry” (Lukashenko’s definition of electoral 
revolutions). With the date of elections approaching the official statements were becoming 
harsher. On March 16 at a joint press conference, the head of the KGB, the Chief Prosecutor 
and the Interior Minister that stated that “under the guise of elections the opposition was 
preparing a violent overthrow of the government on election day and warned that all 
individuals who joined election day protests would be ‘considered as terrorists under Article 
289 of the penal code’ ”10. The independent electoral observers were refused entrance to 
Belarus or expelled from the country; for example, on March 15, eight members of a 
Scandinavian unofficial election observers group Silba were expelled, eight Members of 
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Georgian Parliament who arrived in Belarus to observe the elections under the aegis of OSCE 
election monitoring mission were refused an entry and deported from Minsk’s airport. On the 
other hand another election monitoring organization- the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) Election Monitoring Organization- was not only spared of any criticism from
Lukashenko, but on the contrary praised for “an unbiased approach and the point of view that 
was expressed during the election monitoring process”11. This fact should not be considered
surprising if the stance of this organization towards these elections taken into account. The 
only violations that CIS observers of the Belarusian presidential election of 2006 found were in 
the process of nomination of candidates and all of these allegations, pertained to opponents of
incumbent Aleksander Lukashenko. This fact was propagandized by the regime to show there
was no election fraud during the elections- the Belarusian Foreign Affairs Ministry issued the
statement “in the opinion of the overwhelming majority of observers, including the CIS 
election observation mission, the election campaign and the ballot complied with the election 
code and Belarus’ international commitments of democratic elections despite the 
unprecedented external pressure”12. 
The regime was particularly brutal against the youth organization Zubr (Bison). The mass 
arrests of Zubr activists took place on a regular basis. The regime also tried to obstruct 
establishing contacts between Belarusian youth and the international community. Foreign 
youth activists visiting Belarus were arrested and deported out of the country. After the 
elections the opposition’s rallies never reached the nigh numbers, as a result of the conducted 
anti-revolutionary measures the revolutionary forces’ capacity to mobilize large number of 
people was weakened. On the other hand, the regime was determined to continue using every 
means to suppress the opposition’s demonstrations. On March 24 -25 2006 the police 
forcefully dispersed the opposition rallies arresting hundreds of people, including the 
opposition leaders who afterwards were jailed. Once again the Belarusian regime triumphed 
over its opponent it. The long-anticipated electoral revolution in Belarus 2006 did not 
materialize. 
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The key factor that should be taken into account in order to understand why the above-
mentioned measures carried out by Lukashenko’s regime succeeded in reducing a chance of 
electoral revolution to zero is a particular nature of electoral revolution itself. Electoral 
revolution can be defined as fall of the government as a result of the peoples’ non-violent 
protests organized by the opposition against fraudulent elections. It can be considered to be 
unique political phenomenon which does not just emerge in the empty place, but needs 
favorable conditions it order to happen. The list of these favorable conditions is long which 
makes it vulnerable for an attack by ant-revolutionary forces. This fact is continually 
emphasized by leading political scientists. For example, Michael McFaul, a leading scholar on 
the post-Soviet region, admitted that “in seeking to learn lessons from these democratic 
breakthroughs, it is important to realize that the list of necessary conditions is long”13. Valerie 
Bunce and Sharon Volchik list four characteristics and five tools of electoral revolutions.14
Kuzio lists ten factors which resulted in revolutions in Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia and 
Ukraine. 15 Though, it is still far from clear a combination of which favorable condition results 
in a successful electoral revolution, one fact is evident that by combating these factorable 
conditions, the post-Soviet regimes can dramatically reduce the revolutionary forces’ capacity 
to stage a successful electoral revolution. 
Detailed insight into these favorable conditions gives a good idea on a true complexity of a 
nature of electoral revolution. It is noteworthy that each scholar studying electoral revolutions 
develops his list of the causes, which though are not diametrically different, still vary to some 
extent. McFaul defines several conditions, which are necessary parts of electoral revolutions: 
“(1) a semi-autocratic regime; (2) an unpopular incumbent; (3) a united and organized 
opposition; (4) an ability to create the perception quickly that the elections results were 
falsified, (5) enough independent media to inform citizens about the falsified vote, (6) apolitical 
opposition capable of mobilizing tens of thousands of demonstrators to protest electoral fraud, 
and (7) divisions among the intelligence forces, military, and police.” 16  Welt also defines 
several elements, which led to the Rose Revolutions (these factors can be generalized to other 
post-Soviet electoral revolutions): “a) the peculiar nature of the regime - unpopular with 
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authoritarian leanings, but weak and tolerant of democratic procedure; b) the peculiar electoral 
scenario of democratic checks-and-balances matched by egregious examples of fraud; c) the 
opposition’s ability to persuade followers that political change was possible; d) external 
democracy promotion efforts, particularly those of the United States via its assistance programs 
and diplomatic efforts, and other international pressures; and e) the passivity of the security 
forces.17
The empirical data from the electoral revolutions in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan 
strongly support these scholars’ ideas. In all these countries there existed the critical mass of 
people unsatisfied with the governments’ performance.  McFaul refers to it the factor of “an 
unpopular incumbent”18. He uses empirical data to prove his argument “In Serbia, polls put 
Milosevic’s popularity at less than 30 percent by the summer of 2000. In Georgia, 82 percent of 
respondents were saying as early as 2001 that the country was going in the wrong direction, up 
from 51 percent the year before. Kuchma’s approval ratings plummeted during his last year in 
office”19.
High number of discontented citizens is the significant factor for the successful revolution,
especially at its final stages, when the regimes faced with the widespread demonstrations and
other mechanisms of civil disobedience starts fall apart. But it should be noted that mere
existence of unsatisfied people is not prerequisite to the revolutions. Dissatisfaction should be
transformed into the dynamic protest movement in which citizens become active agents of
change. This is achieved through use of other factors. Welt combines the factor of 
unpopularity of the regime with “[its] unusual tolerance for the “motions of democracy” and a 
visible lack of regime strength”20. Indeed, if the regime’s tolerance for ‘motions of democracy’ 
can be explained with its semi-authoritarian nature, ‘visible lack of regime strength’ can be 
conveniently explained with the division among the actors of power- McFaul refers to it as 
“splits among the guys with guns” 21.
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The mobilization of a high number of demonstrators is possible only through the coordinated
efforts of a united opposition. McFaul maintains that “a united opposition – or the perception 
of a united front – is a third factor that appears crucial for democratic breakthrough”22. United
opposition in case of the post-Soviet electoral revolutions was better positioned to conduct 
preelection social mobilization, expose the election fraud, manage the demonstrations, and 
conduct negotiations with the government. People were more inclined to support the 
opposition when it acted in unison than when it was divided and fragmented. The lack of 
visible friction among the opposition leaders showed to the public that the leaders “could stand 
above narrow personal interests and unite around an election platform”23. Existence of united 
opposition helped the international community to identify the major actors from the 
opposition they can communicate with. Nevertheless, the level of opposition’s unity varied 
from country to country- for example, it was high in Georgia and Ukraine and lower in 
Kyrgyzstan. But in every crucial moment the position leaders spoke in one voice.
Semi-authoritarian nature of regime is the most unique feature of electoral revolutions. Every 
post-Soviet electoral revolution took place in the countries with semi-authoritarian regimes: 
Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. Scholars maintain that it is not a mere coincidence and there 
is a firm link between the nature of political regimes and causes of electoral revolution. In this 
regard, Kalandadze and Orenstein explain that “electoral protests are more likely to succeed in 
hybrid than in more closed authoritarian regimes due to a favorable combination of factors in 
the former such as a better organized opposition, a more independent media, and the security 
forces reluctant to use violence against the demonstrators”24. Because of particularity of their 
political nature, hybrid regimes are compelled to create the façade of democracy and control 
the political processes through ‘soft power’ (occasionally ‘hard power’) tools. However, such 
regimes do not succeed in shutting down completely the operational space for opposition, 
which uses the limited opportunities it possesses to expand its support base and create 
favorable conditions for its success.
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External factors in general and International non-profit organizations in particular, youth 
organizations, independent election monitoring organizations were also instrumental in 
bringing down the regimes in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. In general, external factors 
which influenced the revolutionary outcomes in the post-Soviet region fall into two categories: 
foreign countries’ governments /international inter-governmental organizations and 
international non-profit organizations. Understandably, the level and format of their 
involvement in the revolutionary processes were different. The foreign governments – the
United States and the European Union (the latter in most cases acting as the single actorness)
were most active among them- in many cases avoided being directly associated with the
revolutionary processes and preferred to act through the international non-profit organizations.
The typical pattern of their activities included: providing funding for local and international 
nongovernmental organizations; exerting pressure on the regimes to hold fair and free 
elections; denouncing the results of the fraudulent elections; and acting as mediators between 
the government and opposition. The empirical data could be used to portray the pattern of the 
foreign government’s involvement. For example, the United States, driven by its agenda of 
expanding democracy worldwide, was instrumental in increasing the capacity of independent 
election monitoring organizations. According to Welt, in the case of the Rose Revolution in 
Georgia “U.S. election assistance was substantial and included funding for voter list reform, 
PVT [parallel voting tabulation] training and implementation, and the cultivation of local 
election monitoring NGOs”25. 
The foreign governments’ firm position on refusing to recognize the fraudulent elections in
Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan was an important supporting tool for the opposition, adding
significant weight to the accusations of election fraud. The news on the position of the
international community would immediately become known to the general public, giving them
additional assurance of the rightness of their cause and lack of support of the regime on
international level. International community acted on individual basis as well. Foreign 
dignitaries visited the Georgia and Ukraine before the elections and brought to the regimes the 
message of an importance of conducting free and fair elections. The dignitaries also acted as 
mediators between the regime and the opposition- example of Ukraine 2004.
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The international non profit organizations, which were doing the actual work in the field, also
came into two categories- funded through the governments or through individual benefactors.
The area of their expertise was wide: providing much needed financial-technical assistance to 
the local non-governmental organizations, training the representatives of media, equipping the
opposition groups with the social mobilization tools, training the opposition activists and often
acting as mediators between the different opposition groups, establishing and supporting the
independent-election monitoring organizations. As they worked directly in the field, these
organizations were in better position in responding to changing realities of the revolutionary
process and offered valuable assistance whenever it was most needed. National-Democratic
Institute of International Affairs, International Republican Institute and Open Society Institute
were among the most active international organizations acting during the post-Soviet 
revolutions. The strength of such organizations was that they were more flexible in working 
with the local actors, than the official structures of the foreign governments and could be 
engaged in activities with them on a regular basis. They served as the important 
communication channels through with the opposition forwarded its message to the wider 
international community.
Pora is a representative of another important mechanism of electoral revolutions- youth
organizations. The members of Otpor (Serbia), Kmara (Georgia), Pora (Ukraine), KelKel
(Kyrgyzstan) were among the most active participants of the revolutions. These organizations,
representing young people from all walks of life, managed to pursue the people that a change 
of the regime was possible. The youth organizations were the most vocal critics of the regimes. 
As Kandelaki, Kmara leader says “Kmara (Enough) played an important role in combating 
widespread political apathy among the Georgian public and youth in particular”26. This was
particularly important factor in the post-Soviet regimes, where although population is generally
interested in politics, the idea of engaging personally in the demonstration aimed at dismantling
the regimes, could be a scary factor for many people.
Funding for the youth organizations came through the international non-profit organizations
which provided necessary funds for setting up and running the organization - for example, 
Kmara was funded by the Open-Society Institute. The youth organizations established regular 
contact with each other and shared their knowledge and expertise. The youth activists from 
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Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine traveled to each others’ countries to offer trainings on the tools of 
civil disobedience. The youth organizations have been in regular contact with local non-
governmental organizations and together exposed the election fraud orchestrated by the 
regime.
In this regard, in the process of exposing the election fraud, particularly significant work was
done by independent election monitoring organizations. They played a crucial part in the post-
Soviet electoral revolutions. They were the independent sources of the documented data on the
cases and scale of election fraud. The information they provided was invaluable in terms of
showing to the public how the regimes stole the elections. Backed with these figures the
opposition was able to intensify his demands for the resignation of the presidents. The election 
monitoring organizations which worked in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan fall into two 
categories: a) international and local organizations. International organizations represented 
non-profit organizations- for example, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems- and inter-governmental organizations-
Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe/ Office of Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights; b) local election monitoring organizations- for example, International Society 
for Fair Elections and Democracy (Georgia), the Committee of Ukrainian Votes (Ukraine). 
These organizations were actively engaged in every phase of election monitoring through 
combining various mechanism- short and long term election observation missions, exit polls, 
compiling voter’s lists. The organizations’ observers represented the experts on election issues, 
foreign dignitaries, representatives of international and local non-profit organizations. The area 
of the organization’s activities either could be one geographical region or the whole country. 
The organizations’ funding came either through the inter-governmental sources, foreign 
governments or non-profit donor organizations. Because they possessed trustworthy, 
documented information on election fraud independent election monitoring organizations 
enjoyed a unique position to influence the revolutionary developments. The opposition could 
not hope to influence a high number of people to join the protests against the election fraud 
orchestrated by the regime unless they had the documented information on the election 
manipulations produced by independent and impartial election monitoring organizations.
The above-mentioned mechanisms were most effective as they acted in unison, gradually 
contributing to the success of electoral revolution. The post-Soviet electoral revolutions
showed that different instruments such peoples’ discontent with the governments’ 
performance, external mechanisms, youth organizations and election monitoring organizations
possess formidable power which matched with the revolutionary situation resulted by specific
causes, has a great potential to bring down almost any (semi)-authoritarian regime.
As the example of Presidential Elections in Belarus 2006 shows the post-Soviet regimes 
gradually realized the scale of threat to their rules posed by the electoral revolutions. The 
comprehended the need to preempt this threat and develop specific antirevolutionary strategy 
and implement the measures. The have particularly launched pre-emptive strikes against the 
revolutionary mechanisms- such as youth organization, political opposition and independent 
election monitoring organizations. These anti-revolutionary measures have not been limited to 
one country or one specific geographical area and saw light in different post-Soviet countries. 
The Azeri regimes’ response to Parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan held on November 6, 
2005 is another example of anti-revolutionary measures. 
Parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan were held on November 6, 2005. The main contenders
were the ruling New Azerbaijan Party and the opposition bloc Azadliq (Freedom) consisting of
the Azerbaijan Popular Front Party, the Equality Party and Azerbaijan Democratic Party.
The Azeri opposition was inspired by the success of the previous post- Soviet electoral 
revolutions. Ali Kerimli, one of the opposition leaders, stated, that “this election is taking place 
after the revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia, which showed people that if you fight to the end, 
you can win. The psychological impact of these events should not be underestimated”27.
However, the government was ready to take on a challenge of suppressing any attempts of 
organizing electoral revolutions
The government also had its own plans towards the opposition. Its major goals with regard to 
the opposition parties were to suppress the opposition’s capacity of organizing the rallies and 
demonstrate to the opposition’s supporters that any attempt to organize electoral revolution 
was doomed for failure. These goals were secured through the use of various anti-revoltionary 
measures.
One important anti-revolutionary measure was the use of physical force to dispel the 
opposition rallies and arrest the opposition activists. The common practice was to deny the 
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opposition authorization to organize the demonstrations in the central locations. This was 
observed in four separate occasions when Azadlig was denied authorization to hold rallies in 
the downtown Baku. By depriving the opposition an opportunity to organize the 
demonstrations either by denying authorization or dispelling the rallies, the regime was 
eradicating one of the fundamental revolutionary mechanism- people’s power. The opposition 
could not hope to organize long and large demonstrations- prerequisite for a successful 
electoral revolution. The demonstrators could not be sure of their safety. Hundreds of people 
were arrested, often for short period, occasionally for several days. According to Ali Kerimli, a 
leader of the opposition Azadlig bloc, “At every rally attempt, we had about 200 of our 
supporters arrested [and] hundreds beaten. Candidates were threatened, and made to withdraw 
[from the race]” 28 .
The regime also carried out measures against the leadership of the opposition movement. On
October 17, Rasul Guliyev, the leader of DPA, sought by the Azeri police on corruption 
charges, was not allowed to come to Azerbaijan, as according to the Azerbaijan government’s 
request he was arrested in Ukraine. On the same day, the officers of Azerbaijan National 
Security Ministry arrested 26 people, mostly members of Guliyev’s party on charges of a coup 
attempt. The official sources stared to circulate the news that that the opposition was planning 
to disrupt the election process and the authorities prevented such a provocation.
Such actions were typical cases of anti-revolutionary measures aimed at discrediting the 
opposition, “demonizing” the concept of electoral revolution and indoctrinating people with 
the idea of the regimes’ omnipotence. The government controlled TVs channels, radio an 
Internet were conducting PR campaigns portraying the opposition as “traitors” and 
“provocateurs” who would plunge the country into an anarchy. 
The regime comprehended the danger that the youth organizations posed to its rule and 
attacked first. In this regard, Fuad Mustafayev, deputy chief of the Popular Front Party, and 
one of the leaders in the Azadlig opposition bloc said that "Authorities were aware of the 
power of the youth movement, and therefore decided to strike a preemptive blow”29. On 
                                                
28 Rovshan Ismayilov, “Azerbaijan’s Campaign Ends, Attention Now Focusing on Post-Election Period,” Eurasia
Insight, October 4, 2005, http://www.eurasianet.org/azerbaijan/news/campaignend_20051104.html.
29 Mina Muradova and Rufat Abbasov, “Youth Groups in Azerbaijan Encounter Difficulties during Run-up to
Parliamentary Elections”, Eurasianet, Azerbaijan Elections 2005. November 3, 2005.
http://www.eurasianet.org/azerbaijan/news/youth_20051103.html
August 3, 2005 Ruslan Bashirli, a leader of Yeni Fikir, was arrested on charges of plotting a 
coup attempt in Azerbaijan with financial backing from Armenian special services. The 
Azerbaijani Prosecutor-General’s office disseminated video that depicted Bashirli signing a 
receipt for $2,000 and drinking cognac with two men identified as Armenian agents. On 
September 12, Yeni Fikir Deputy Chairperson Nuri was detained for 48 hours on charges of 
conspiring to organize a coup against the Azerbaijani government. According to the official 
sources, while attending a training session in Poland sponsored by the National Democratic 
Institute, Nuri allegedly received instructions on organizing anti-government protests with the 
aim of overthrowing the government. The same day, Ramin Tagiyev, Yeni Fikir another deputy 
chairperson, was sentenced to a three-month prison term for his role in a supposed coup plot. 
Commenting on these arrests, leader of the Popular Front Party Chairman Ali Kerimli stated 
that the arrests were carried out because of the authorities’ fear of Yeni Fikir’s increasing 
popularity and their desire to reduce youth activism in Azerbaijan.Human Rights Watch 
condemned the regime’s oppressive policy against the youth organizations. 
The regime also launched the attacks aimed at disrupting the cooperation between the local 
youth organizations and the Ukrainian youth organization- Pora. On September 15, 2005, 
Sergei Yevtushenko, a leader of Pora, was arrested at Baku airport. Two days after he was 
deported to Ukraine. Azerbaijan also deported Pora activists who traveled to Azerbaijan as 
election observers- among them were a senior leader of Pora, Yevhen Zolotariov, and Serhii 
Taran, head of the Kyiv-based Institute for Mass Media, Ukraine's representation for the 
international watchdog Reporters Without Borders. 
Understandably, the wave of arrests of the leaders and the members of the youth organizations 
as well as thwarting the attempts of establishing cooperation with more experienced foreign
counterparts significantly undermined the youth organizations’ capacities to influence the 
preelection and post-elections developments. The youth organizations in Azerbaijan never 
managed to become such as significant force as Otpor, Kmara and Pora.
The election was marked by the fact of establishing of various “pseudo- Independent” election
monitoring organizations. As Maharramov argues “The existence of such groups- which claim
the same status as nonpartisan CSOs [civil society organization]- makes it difficult for CSOs to
mount election observation efforts that citizens can trust and tarnishes their accomplishments 
in doing so”30.The high number of election monitoring organizations was confusing, often
purposefully orchestrated by the regime. The different findings issued by these organizations
were aimed at confusing the public with the real situation. The same goal was attempted 
through use of various exit polls. The opposition claimed that the sponsors of the two 
companies Mitofsky International and Saar Poll- were the representatives of the Azeri regime 
and the aim was to produce the results which would compete with those of USAID funded 
independent exit pall.
With all these preemptive strikes carried out the by the regime, it is not accidental that the
oppositions’ protests against the elections results which granted the absolute majority to the
governmental party was not strong. The opposition was disorganized and lacked the capacity
to mount widespread protest movement. It became engaged in the negotiations with
government which did not bring any results for them. The attempt to organize a rally in
downtown Baku on November 26 was brutally suppressed by the police and the authorization 
for future rallies was denied by the Baku city government. The international community did 
not react that strongly to the developments in Azerbaijan as in Georgia or Ukraine. Apparently, 
the USA and the EU were not interested in ‘spoiling’ relations with the strategically important 
country rich in oil. Russia was prompt in offering support for the Azeri regime. The Russian 
Foreign Affairs Minister Lavrov stated that “They [violations] were not so serious as to prompt 
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us to call into question the outcome of the elections”31. The Russian President Putin
congratulated the Azerbaijan President Aliyev with “the successful completion of parliament
elections.”32. Without the strong capacity to organize the mass protest and the considerable
international backing, the Azeri opposition did not attempt to continue organizing the rallies.
This marked the end of attempt to change the regime in Azerbaijan.
The success of Belarusian and Azeri regimes to stamp their victory over the opposition forces 
through use of anti-revolutionary measures has been an inspiring lesson for Russia’s regime
when it gears for crucial parliamentary and presidential elections in December 2007/March 
2008. In this regard Russia’s regime has not only benefited from the experience of other 
countries but moved anti-revolutionary measures to higher, more sophisticated level. The 
major focus has been taken on establishing pro-governmental youth organizations, controlling 
international and domestic non profit organizations and developing anti revolutionary ideology.
In this process, an instrumental role has been played by Russian political technologists (spin
doctors) who assumed a leading role in designing anti-revolutionary measures. Gleb Pavlovsky, 
director of the Effective Politics Foundation; Modest Kolerov, head of a Kremlin department 
in charge of relations with the CIS; Yevgeny Kozhokin, director of the Strategic Studies 
Institute; Andranik Migranyan, chairman of the Commission on Issues of Globalization and 
National Development Strategy in the Public Chamber; Sergei Markov, director of the Institute 
for Political Studies, are few among dozen of leading political technologists who are on the 
vanguard of defending/ promoting the Kremlin’s interests not only in Russia, but in other 
post-Soviet countries as well. These technologists among others could be credited with
establishing pro-governmental youth organizations, forming pro-governmental civil 
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organizations, establishing ‘pseudo-democratic’ election-monitoring organizations, spinning the 
public opinion in favor of the government through information technologies- internet and 
media. Russian political technologists are active not only in Russian but in other post-Soviet 
countries The group of the Russia technologists led by Gleb Pavlovski and Sergei Markov were 
actively assisting Yanukovych’s election campaign during the Presidential Elections in Ukraine 
2005 . These technologists were instrumental in designing the information campaigns for 
Yanukovych which underlined his achievements and positive qualities, as well as designing 
propaganda campaigns against the orange opposition in which they were portrayed as the 
“puppets” of the West.  A special comment should be made with regard to the role of Russian 
political technologists in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. According to political analysts the tactics 
of mimicking the tactics of the electoral revolutions used by the regimes were developed by 
these technologists who “have been working since Ukraine’s ‘orange revolution’ to stymie any 
popular revolt in Russia itself, as well as in other ex-Soviet republics” 33. These tactics 
afterwards were disseminated among the regimes which resorted to them during the elections.
The Russian political technologists also visited Uzbekistan several months after the Andijan 
massacre. On the meeting with the President Karimov the goal of the visit became evident 
“noting that Uzbekistan is currently under an "information attack," the Uzbek strongman told 
his Russian guests, ‘I am confident in your unbiased and objective evaluation of the issues” 34 .
This comment made by the ruler who never been particular generous in giving a praise 
underlines the importance of the factor of Russian political technologists in developing 
information strategies for the post-Soviet regimes
The product of joint efforts of the Russian political technologists and the Russia’s regime is 
creation of the pro-governmental youth- Idushie Vmeste (Walking Together); Nashi (Ours); 
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Mestnye (Locals). The idea behind establishing these youth organizations has been to assemble 
the well-organized groups of youth people who would be instrumental in organizing the pro-
governmental organizations and dispersing the opposition rallies.
The regime also aimed at weakening the opposition’s capacity to recruit youth. In this regard
when explaining the Russia’s Youth Policy, the political analyst Stanislav Belkovskii stated that
“the goal of this program is understandable to me, and it consists of keeping youth from 
joining radical opposition group”35.  The same comment was made by the leader of Nashi 
Yakemenko according to whom “he wants the ‘West to see that the Ukrainian variant will not 
happen here ’”36. These organizations held numerous rallies in which the tens of thousands of 
activists participated and where the main message conveyed was to express their support for 
Russia’s regime and contempt against the democratic opposition. According to Sergei Fateev, 
leader of the Mestnye, the members of his organization “are against political charlatans who 
want to divide our society before the elections. They are preparing to sell Russia out to the
West” 37. Though the government at first tried to distance itself from these organizations the 
further developments showed that they were not only established by the Kremlin, but they 
were a part of a bigger antirevolutionary plan which among other targets was also aimed against 
non-governmental organizations.
The regime’s steps unleashed against NGOs can be divided into two groups- against the 
domestic NGOs and international NGOs. In January 2006, the President Putin singed a law 
which imposed the restrictions on registration, financing and activities of NGOs. The new law 
requires that foreign organizations and groups which receive funding from outside Russia 
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register with the government. With regard to this law Putin stated that “Whether these 
organizations want it or not, they become an instrument in the hands of foreign states that use 
them to achieve their own political objectives. This situation is unacceptable. This law is 
designed to prevent interference in Russia’s internal political life by foreign countries and create 
transparent conditions for the financing of nongovernmental organizations” 38. According to 
the Member of Russian Alexei Ostrovsky who was one of the bill's sponsors, “legislation 
should help the government clamp down on NGOs that might use foreign funding to promote 
an upheaval like Ukraine's Orange revolution” 39. This bill received much criticism from the 
international community which with enough reasons considered it violation of democratic 
standards. Another major tool to combat NGOs was the use of propaganda campaign which 
portrayed NGOs as spies and puppets working against Russia’s and Russia’s allies national 
interests. For example, a typical case of such propaganda was statement made by Russian 
Federal Security Service head Nikolai Patrushev “foreign intelligence services were plotting a 
so-called "velvet revolution" in Belarus to topple the government by financing the opposition 
through non-governmental organizations”40.
The regime also attempted to develop the anti-revolutionary ideology in order to offer an
alterative ideological basis to Russia’s population. In this regard the concept of ‘Sovereign
Democracy’ which was devolved in February 2006 by Deputy Head of the Presidential
Administration Vladislav Surkov represents a case book example. This doctrine which outlines
Russia’s way of democracy (according to the Kremlin’s understanding of democracy)
immediately was considered as “Moscow’s response to the dangerous combination of populist
pressure from below and international pressure from above that destroyed the Leonid Kuchma
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regime”41. Surkov himself did not conceal that the focus of the doctrine was combating “a soft
take” in Russia (his reference to electoral revolutions). As he stated “I can't say that this issue is
off the agenda, since if they managed to pull it off in four countries” -- the reference includes
Serbia in the list of “orange” victims – “why not do it in a fifth? I think that these attempts will
not be limited to 2007-08 [when Russia holds parliamentary and presidential elections]. Our
foreign friends can and will try to repeat them”42. Surkov’s reference to the elections 2007-2008 
proves their vital importance to the Kremlin and explains the enormous amount of work 
carried out by the regime in order to avoid electoral revolution and insure a smooth transition 
of power from Putin to his successor. In general, the dominant opinion now is that there is 
only slimmest chance of electoral revolution in Russia (the fact that can be in some measure
explained by the success of anti-revolutionary measures). 
The above mentioned examples show the important role that anti-revolutionary measures have 
started to play in the process of retaining power of the regimes. Based on the available 
information these measures can be conveniently divided into ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power measures.  
Soft measures include: use discourse/rhetoric of political and public figures aimed at 
corrupting a notion of electoral revolution; use of spin-doctors (political technologists) and 
think tanks for developing anti-revolutionary measures, establishing pro-governmental youth 
organizations, forming pro-governmental civil organizations, establishing election-monitoring 
organizations, use of information technologies- internet, media, adopting new election and 
criminal codes and amending the existing ones aimed at reducing a probability of electoral 
revolution, curbing the activities of international non-governmental organizations, banning 
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local non-governmental organizations, controlling media, splitting opposition. Hard measures 
are: training, mobilizing and using police, army, intelligence services against the revolutionary 
forces, surpassing the demonstrators, jailing the political opponents, crashing public protests, 
killing the protestors.  
The experience of recent political developments in the region shows that the regimes are 
gradually closing the ‘operation space’ for the opposition and civil society. The pattern of 
suppression does not have nature of indiscriminate and random purging, but it carefully 
analyzed, reveals the well-planned and devised plot of antirevolutionary measures. The regimes 
directly and purposefully attack those tools and mechanisms which might be used by the 
opposition and civil society if an attempt of electoral revolution is made.
The message can be conveyed to the forces striving to promote democracy in the post-Soviet
region -the anti-revolutionary measures of the post-Soviet regimes is a matter of reality; they
exist; they have been tried, and as they proved to be successful in suppressing the revolutionary
forces and prolonging the regimes’ existence, they will be used again in the future. Now it time
for the democratic forces to take upon a challenge on responding to these anti-revolutionary
measures. The future developments in the post-Soviet regimes will show how successfully the
democratic forces will be in doing so.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Mikheil Kechaqmadze is an affiliated scholar at GFSIS. His research interests include the 
process of democratization in the post-Soviet region. 
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